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BROADER IS BETTER: HOW COURTS
SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT
AN ALLEGATION OF FRAUD FALLS UNDER





In the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
("SLUSA"),' Congress preempted actions "in any State or Federal
court by any private party alleging-an untrue statement or
omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or
sale of a covered security."2 SLUSA was a reaction to plaintiffs'
strategic response to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 ("PSLRA" or "Reform Act"), which was enacted to combat
perceived abuses of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
t Associate Managing Editor, St. John's Law Review, J.D., 2014, St. John's
University School of Law; B.A., Government, 2011, Georgetown University. The
author would like to thank Professor Michael Perino for his help in creating this
Note, as well as the author's family for all of their support over the past three years.
1 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.). SLUSA amended both the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1994), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (1994
& Supp. II 1996). See id. sec. 101(a)(1), § 16, 112 Stat. at 3227-30 (amending the
1933 Act); id. sec. 101(b), § 28, 112 Stat. at 3230-33 (amending the 1934 Act). Thus,
SLUSA is codified in two seperate sections of the federal securities laws. See
15 U.S.C. § 77p (2012) (originally enacted as Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 16, 48
Stat. 74, 84); id. § 78bb (originally enacted as Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch.
404, § 28, 48 Stat. 881, 903). The SLUSA amendments to each of the Acts are
substantially the same with slightly different language. See generally id. §§ 77p,
78bb.
2 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also id. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (language
slightly different in 1934 Act).
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securities laws.' To avoid the PSLRA, litigants would file
securities class action lawsuits in state rather than in federal
court.4 Congress feared that the avoidance of the federal forum
would undercut the PSLRA's effectiveness, and thus enacted
SLUSA.5 Congress intended SLUSA to create uniform national
standards for securities class actions involving national capital
markets.6
SLUSA clearly preempts traditional state securities fraud
class actions. For example, if a publicly traded company makes
fraudulent statements in a press release regarding its revenues,
that action would be preempted under SLUSA.7 However, what
if the complaint includes a disclaimer stating its allegations are
not based on fraud, but on a state-law claim such as a breach of
fiduciary duty or a violation of state unfair competition laws?8
Or what if the language of the complaint does not allege a
misrepresentation or omission, but a misrepresentation or
omission is implicated in a breach of contract claim?9 For
example, if a trust beneficiary sues the bank that formerly
administered the trust on behalf of all trust beneficiaries,
alleging the bank breached its fiduciary and contractual duties to
the class by failing to inform trust beneficiaries that their trust
accounts would be invested in proprietary mutual funds, is that
action preempted by SLUSAV ° The courts have struggled to
interpret the misrepresentation language of SLUSA's preemption
provision.
This Note argues that the correct approach for interpreting
the scope of SLUSA's preemption language is the "literalist"
approach taken by the Sixth Circuit. Part I of this Note lays out
the legal framework of the Reform Act of 1995, Congress's intent
3 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see infra Part I.A.1.
4 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act § 2(2), 112 Stat. at 3227
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (Congressional Findings of 1998 Amendment)).
' See id. § 2(3).
6 See id. § 2(5).
7 For a discussion on what constitutes a "covered security," see infra notes 53-
54 and accompanying text.
' Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2009); see also
Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc. 658 F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2011); Rowinski v.
Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 296 (3d Cir. 2005).
9 See Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 297.
"' See Segal, 581 F.3d at 308-10. According to the Sixth Circuit, this action is
preempted. Id. at 310.
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in enacting the legislation, and the unintended consequences
that flowed from the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements.
Part I also discusses SLUSA, what led to its passage, and its
preemption language. Additionally, it looks at the Supreme
Court's interpretation of preemption statutes generally, as well
as the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of SLUSA in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit.11
Part II examines the three distinct approaches that exist in
the Third, Ninth, and Sixth Circuits for defining what is and
what is not within the scope of SLUSA's preemption language.
One approach is the Third Circuit approach, which tries to
distinguish between essential and extraneous allegations in a
complaint. 12 If the allegation of fraud is essential to the claim,
the suit is necessarily preempted and dismissed. 3 But if the
allegation of fraud is merely "an extraneous detail," 4 the action
may proceed in state court.15
The Ninth Circuit takes a second approach, which preempts
an action if it alleges in language or substance a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact, but
subsequently allows the suit to be dismissed without prejudice. 6
This approach permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint
that removes the fraud allegation and therefore is not preempted
under SLUSA.'7
A third approach, referred to throughout this Note as the
Sixth Circuit literalist approach, reads the language of SLUSA
broadly.'" The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have also used this
1 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
12 See generally LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2008).
11 See id. at 141. Whether the dismissal should be without prejudice was left as
an open question. Id. at 129 n.6.
14 See id. at 141.
15 See id.
16 See Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., 442 F. App'x 247, 248 (9th Cir. 2011).
17 See id. at 248-49.
18 See Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 555-56 (6th Cir.
2011); see also Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2009).
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approach in earlier cases. 19 Under this analysis, if a complaint
can be interpreted as alleging fraud, it is preempted under
SLUSA and subject to dismissal with prejudice.2"
Finally, Part III criticizes the Third and Ninth Circuit
approaches and argues that the literalist approach is the correct
standard for analyzing SLUSA's preemption language. While the
distinction of whether or not the misrepresentation or omission is
a necessary element of an alleged cause of action seems like a
defensible bright-line rule, the Third Circuit approach is
problematic.2 Lower courts have struggled to apply the standard
consistently, and in some cases the distinction between essential
and extraneous claims has proved ephemeral.22
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit approach gives
plaintiffs the ability to amend their complaint so they can cure
what originally triggered SLUSA preemption.23  While this
approach seems fair, it is difficult, if not impossible, to apply.24
Although the language alleging a misrepresentation or omission
may no longer appear, it is difficult for a court to determine
whether or not the plaintiff has eliminated the allegation in
substance from the complaint.2" Further, this approach has
caused confusion within the Ninth Circuit, which is illustrative of
the problems it presents.26
The Sixth Circuit approach is consistent with Congress's
intent in enacting SLUSA and with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of SLUSA in Dabit. It will also lead to consistency
19 While this approach was dubbed the "Sixth Circuit Approach" by Judge
Posner in Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011), it was used before in
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. See Miller v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 698,
702 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The issue of preemption thus hinges on the content of the
allegations-not on the label affixed to the cause of action .... [lit is plain that Miller
has alleged both untrue statements and omissions of material fact in his state law
breach of contract claim."); Dudek v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 295 F.3d 875, 879-80 (8th
Cir. 2002) ("Although plaintiffs deleted the allegations of fraud, misrepresentation,
and non-disclosure that permeated their New York complaint, the fact allegations in
the two complaints are otherwise essentially the same,..., both complaints allege
that defendants misstated or omitted material facts in connection with the purchase
and sale of the tax-deferred annuities.").
20 See Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 554; Segal, 581 F.3d at 311.
21 See infra Part III.A.
22 See infra Part III.A.
23 See infra Part III.B.
24 See infra Part III.B.
25 See infra Part III.B.
26 See infra Part III.B.
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among the circuits. Congress enacted SLUSA to promote
uniform national standards.27 It was concerned with the flood of
litigation from federal to state courts and the increasing
prevalence of strike suits in state courts.2" The Sixth Circuit does
not read anything into the statutory language; it takes it at face
value. When a plaintiff alleges a misrepresentation or omission,
the action is dismissed with prejudice, consistent with Congress's
intent to achieve uniformity and consistency. In Dabit, the
Supreme Court held that the language of SLUSA should be read
broadly to ensure the effectiveness of the PSLRA.29 The Sixth
Circuit approach reads the language of SLUSA broadly, in line
with the Court's interpretation of SLUSA.3 ° Most importantly,
the literalist approach provides a standard that will create
uniformity among the circuits. The Sixth Circuit's approach is
straightforward and simple; the court looks to see if there is an
allegation of misrepresentation or omission in the language or
substance of the complaint.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Legislation
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
The PSLRA was enacted to combat perceived abuses of the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.A Congress,
as well as the business community, was concerned with the
prevalence of strike suits-lawsuits brought for their settlement
value as opposed to their merits.32  The PSLRA's procedural
27 H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
2 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 2(2), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (2012) (Congressional
Findings of 1998 Amendment)).
29 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86-88
(2006).
30 See Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 2011);
Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 2009).
31 See Jennifer O'Hare, Preemption Under the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act: If It Looks Like a Securities Fraud Claim and Acts Like a Securities
Fraud Claim, Is It a Securities Fraud Claim?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 325, 334 (2004);
Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 290 (1998).
32 O'Hare, supra note 31, at 334-35; see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-50 (1975) (limiting the private right of action under Rule
10b-5 to plaintiffs who were either purchasers or sellers of securities). Generally, in
2014]
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reforms were intended to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to
bring federal securities fraud actions in an attempt to eliminate
the problem of strike suits in federal court.3
Many unintended consequences flowed from the passage of
the PSLRA.3 4 Traditionally, plaintiffs preferred federal private
rights of action over state claims, particularly in class action
litigation involving publicly traded companies. 35 But to avoid the
procedural requirements of the Reform Act, plaintiffs filed their
claims under state law in state court. 6 Evidence suggests that
after the Reform Act, there was a significant shift in litigation
from federal to state courts, especially in California. While
there was debate over the actual size and scope of the shift,
Congress was persuaded by the evidence, which prompted
hearings in 1997 and 1998 that led to the passage of SLUSA.38
strike suits plaintiffs would allege that a company issued a misleading press release
or other public document, which caused investors to purchase or sell their securities
at lower prices. O'Hare, supra note 31, at 334-35. Plaintiffs would sue the issuer,
the issuer's management, as well as the issuer's accounting firm, law firm, and
bank. Id. at 335. Defendants would often settle even non-meritorious claims to avoid
the high costs and bad publicity that accompanied these types of claims. Id.
33 See MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE PSLRA 11-3
(2012); see also O'Hare, supra note 31, at 335. The procedural reforms in the PSLRA
included a heightened pleading standard and an automatic stay of discovery upon
the filing of a motion to dismiss. Id. It also included a lead plaintiff provision, a
proportionate liability provision, and a provision requiring courts to inquire at the
conclusion of each suit whether counsel had complied with Rule 11. Id. at 335-36.
34 To learn more about some of these unintended consequences, see OFFICE OF
THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 2, 4-5 (1997) [hereinafter SEC REPORT];
Perino, supra note 31, at 290-92; Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino,
Securities Litigation Reform: The First Year's Experience (Stanford Law Sch. John
M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 140, 1997).
35 PERINO, supra note 33, at 11-4 ("[P]laintiffs filed most of these cases in
federal court for one simple reason: federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
Rule 10b-5 actions." (footnote omitted)); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Allocation of
Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts for Private Remedies Under the
Federal Securities Law, 60 N.C. L. REV. 707, 713 (1982). For further analysis of why
plaintiffs preferred federal court, see PERINO, supra note 33, at 11-4, 11-5.
36 O'Hare, supra note 31, at 337.
37 See SEC REPORT, supra note 34, at 67-68; Perino, supra note 31, at 299;
Grundfest & Perino, supra note 34. Additionally, plaintiffs, after the Reform Act,
began pursuing a dual-track litigation strategy to evade the Reform Act's discovery
stay. See PERINO, supra note 33, at 11-9; see also O'Hare, supra note 31, at 337.
38 See PERINO, supra note 33, at 11-10.
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2. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act
Proponents of SLUSA argued that the legislation was
essential to the effectiveness of the Reform Act,39 while opponents
insisted Congress should await results before considering a
preemption proposal because it was too soon to tell the
legislation's true effect.40  The argument in favor of SLUSA
ultimately prevailed, and the President signed the bill into law
on November 3, 1998. 4'
The SLUSA preemption provision provides:
No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law
of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any
State or Federal court by any private party alleging-
(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or
(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase
or sale of a covered security.42
If SLUSA applies, it allows the defendant to remove the
claim to federal court where it must be dismissed.43 Congress
inserted this provision to ensure that federal courts would
interpret the scope of preemption under SLUSA.44  When an
action does not fall within SLUSA it must be remanded to state
court.45
The legislative history of SLUSA demonstrates that
Congress was primarily concerned with protecting issuers from
strike suits.4" Congress recognized the need for uniform federal
securities laws in order to limit the exposure of publicly traded
companies after an initial public offering.47 Congress found that
" See H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 9-11 (1998).
40 See id. at 45; S. REP. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998) (dissenting views). See generally
Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).
41 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
42 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b)(1)-(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see also id. § 78bb(f)(1)(A)-
(B) (language slightly different in the 1934 Act).
43 PERINO, supra note 33, at 11-14 to -15; O'Hare, supra note 31, at 342.
4 See H.R. REP. No. 105-640, at 16 (stating the purpose of removal is to
"prevent a State court from inadvertently, improperly, or otherwise maintaining
jurisdiction over an action that is preempted [under SLUSA]").
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(d)(4), 78bb(f)(3)(D).
46 H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); see also O'Hare, supra note
31, at 338.
17 The Conference Report stated:
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the PSLRA caused a shift in securities class action lawsuits from
federal to state court.48 The shift operated against the PSLRA's
purpose, thereby inhibiting its effectiveness.49  SLUSA was
enacted because of the strong federal interest in the regulation of
securities in order to protect investors and promote strong
markets. 50 To prevent this shift in litigation from frustrating the
purpose of the PSLRA, Congress found it was appropriate to
enact national standards for securities class action lawsuits.51
While Congress left intact concurrent state-federal jurisdiction,
this was not an issue Congress was concerned about when it
enacted SLUSA. Congress's main aim was to prevent the
circumvention of the PSLRA, not to readdress the jurisdiction
over these claims.52
SLUSA is not all-encompassing. SLUSA does not apply to
all fraud claims involving securities brought under state law. It
is limited to "covered securities," which are generally nationally
traded securities.53 The definition of "covered securities" in
SLUSA is modeled after the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996, which preempted many state-law
offering rules for securities that Congress determined were
"inherently national in nature."54  Additionally, only "covered
It is important to note that companies can not control where their
securities are traded after an initial public offering.... As a result,
companies with publicly-traded securities can not choose to avoid
jurisdictions which present unreasonable litigation costs. Thus, a single
state can impose the risks and costs of its pecular [sic] litigation system on
all national issuers.
H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Oversight Hearing on
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 3 (1998) (written
statement submitted by Hon. Keith Paul Bishop, Comm'r, California Department of
Corporations)); see also S. REP. No. 105-182, at 6 (1998).
48 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 2(2), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (Congressional Findings
of 1998 Amendment)).
41 See id. § 2(3).
50 See id. § 2(4).
51 Id. § 2(5).
52 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
53 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)(1)-(2), 78bb(fi(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
5 H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 43 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also PERINO, supra note
33, at 11-37. SLUSA provides:
The term "covered security" means a security that satisfies the standards
for a covered security specified in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 77r(b) of
this title at the time during which it is alleged that the misrepresentation,
omission, or manipulative or deceptive conduct occurred, except that such
[Vol. 88:433
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class actions" are preempted, which include three different types
of actions: (1) actions brought on behalf of more than fifty
persons; (2) actions brought on a representative basis; and (3) a
group of joined or consolidated actions.55 Even if a class action
falls into one of these three "covered class action" categories, it is
only covered under SLUSA if the plaintiff seeks damages on
behalf of the class.56 Finally, the preemption provision is subject
to a number of exceptions and exclusions, which include the
"Delaware carve-out," as well as derivative actions brought by
shareholders on behalf of a corporation.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation
1. Preemption Statutes
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,5" the
Supreme Court turned to the settled framework it laid out in
earlier cases such as Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr59 for interpreting
preemption statutes.6" Medtronic involved the ability of Lora
Lohr, who was injured due to the failure of her pacemaker, to
recover damages under Florida common law from Medtronic,
Inc., the manufacturer of the device.6 The statute involved was
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 ("MDA"), and Medtronic
argued that the statute preempted state common law negligence
actions against the manufacturers of an allegedly defective
medical device.62 While the statute expressly preempted certain
state causes of action, the Court had to determine the scope of
the actions covered by the MDA.63 Ultimately, the Court held
term shall not include any debt security that is exempt from registration
under this subchapter pursuant to rules issued by the Commission under
section 77d(2) of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(3); see also id. § 78bb(f)(5)(E). For additional information on what
constitutes a "covered security," see PERINO, supra note 33, at 11-37 to -39; O'Hare,
supra note 31, at 339 n.84.
" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(f)(2)(A), 78bb(f)(5)(B).
56 See id.
17 O'Hare, supra note 31, at 341. Under the "Delaware carve-out," certain
actions are preserved for violations of the fiduciary duty of disclosure under state
law. Id.
58 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
59 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
60 Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87.
61 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 474.
62 Id.
I Id. at 484.
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that Lora Lohr's action was not preempted by the MDA.64
Relevant to this discussion is the analytical framework the Court
used to analyze the MDA's preemption language.
The Court began its analysis by stating that the
interpretation of the scope of a preemption statute starts with
the statutory text, 6 but that this evaluation "does not occur in a
contextual vacuum."66  The interpretation is informed by two
presumptions about the nature of preemption.6  The first
presumption is that Congress "does not cavalierly pre-empt state-
law causes of action. '6 The analysis starts with the assumption
that the police powers of the states are not to be superseded
unless Congress had a clear and manifest purpose. 69 The Court
concluded that this presumption is relevant and applicable to
questions concerning the scope of preemption statutes.7 0
The second presumption in the Court's analysis is guided by
the notion that "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone of pre-emption analysis."1 Consequently, the scope of
a preemption statute must be interpreted and understood with "a
fair understanding of congressional purpose.72  Congressional
purpose is primarily derived from the statutory preemption
language as well as the "statutory framework" surrounding it.73
Also relevant is the "structure and purpose of the statute as a
whole,"7 4 through not only the statutory text, but also the court's
reasoned understanding of Congress's intention for the statute
and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect "business,
consumers, and the law."7 5
14 Id. at 487.
65 Id. at 484-85 (citing Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111
(1992) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
66 Id. at 485.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The
Supreme Court has stated its task in preemption cases is to enforce the "clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
70 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
71 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (alteration in original)
(quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
72 Id. at 529 n.27 (emphasis added).
7' Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
14 Id. at 98 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
71 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486.
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Medtronic illustrates the interpretive framework used by the
Supreme Court in its analysis of preemption statutes. The Court
employed this framework to analyze SLUSA and the scope of its
preemption language in Dabit.
76
2. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
In Dabit, the Supreme Court held that SLUSA applied
broadly to preempt state-law class action claims.7 There, the
respondent, Shadi Dabit, a former Merrill Lynch broker, filed a
class action on behalf of himself and all other former or current
brokers, who, while employed at Merrill Lynch, purchased
certain stocks-for themselves and their clients-between
December 1, 1999, and December 31, 2000.11 Dabit claimed
Merrill Lynch breached its fiduciary duty and covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by disseminating misleading research and
manipulating stock prices.7 9 Dabit asserted that the class was
damaged by Merrill Lynch's actions in two ways: (1) the
misrepresentations and manipulative tactics caused them to hold
onto overvalued securities, and (2) the brokers lost commission
fees when their clients, who became aware that they made poor
investments, took their business elsewhere.8 °
The district court granted Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss
on the ground that the action fell within SLUSA.8 1 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding the claims
did not allege fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale" of
securities under SLUSA because the fraud was not alleged by a
purchaser or seller of securities.8 2 Because the complaint alleged
that the brokers were fraudulently induced to retain or delay
selling their securities, it fell outside of SLUSA's preemptive
83scope. The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with the
decision of the Second Circuit, and concluded holders of securities
76 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86-88
(2006).
17 Id. at 74.
78 Id. at 75.
79 Id.
I Id. at 76.
81 See In re Merill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Litig., No.
02MDL1484(MP), 2003 WL 1872820, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003), affd in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 395
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 71 (2006); see also Dabit, 547 U.S. at 76.
82 Dabit, 547 U.S. at 77; see Dabit, 395 F.3d at 51.
', Dabit, 547 U.S. at 77.
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also fell within SLUSA's scope. 4 The Supreme Court employed
the Medtronic framework and ultimately determined that
SLUSA should be read broadly.8"
The Court in its analysis briefly recounted the events that
led up to the adoption of SLUSA,"6 highlighting the large federal
interest in protecting the integrity and efficient operation of the
market for nationally traded securities."' The Court found that
the presumption that Congress envisioned a broad interpretation
of the statute follows not only from the plain meaning of the
statute, but also from the concerns that "culminated in SLUSA's
enactment."88 The Court stated that a narrow reading of SLUSA
would undercut the effectiveness of the 1995 Reform Act, thus
operating contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose, which is to
prevent strike suits from frustrating the objectives of the
PSLRA. s9 It also acknowledged the unintended consequences of
the PSLRA that prompted the enactment of SLUSA.90 If the
Court were to adopt the respondent's construction, the prospect
of parallel class action proceedings in state and federal court
would be raised, which the Court said would conflict with
Congress's stated preference for national standards.9
The Court reasoned that its conclusion was consistent with
the presumption that Congress does not "cavalierly" preempt
state-law causes of action.92 According to the Court, SLUSA does
not preempt any state causes of action; it simply denies plaintiffs
the right to use the class action device for certain claims.93
Further, the Court stated that the tailored exceptions to SLUSA
preemption show that Congress did not act "cavalierly."94
Finally, federal law has been the traditional vehicle for asserting
84 Id. at 77-78. The Second Circuit decision was vacated and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Id. at 89.
s5 Id. at 87-88.
86 Id. at 81-82.
87 Id. at 81.
8 Id. at 86.
89 Id. ("SLUSA's stated purpose [was] ... 'to prevent certain State private
securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the
objectives' of the 1995 Act." (quoting Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, § 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a
note (2012) (Congressional Findings of 1998 Amendment)))).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 86-87.





class action securities fraud claims. 95 Therefore, this is not an
area where a federal statute eliminated a historically entrenched
state-law remedy.9
6
The Supreme Court in Dabit asserted that a broad reading of
the SLUSA language is proper. 97 The Court reiterated that the
purpose of SLUSA is to prevent strike suits and create national
standards for securities class action lawsuits.9  The Court
pointed to the plain meaning of SLUSA, Congress's intent in
enacting SLUSA, as well as the presumptions employed by the
Court to analyze preemption statutes to support its broad
construction.99
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT DIVISION
A. The Three Approaches
Since Dabit, several circuit courts have interpreted the scope
of the SLUSA preemption language-"any private party
alleging-a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact" 00-
differently, causing a split of authority.101 Specifically, the Third,
Ninth, and Sixth Circuits have developed three distinct
approaches to whether an allegation of a misrepresentation or
omission should be enough to preempt an action under SLUSA.
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to a case raising
this issue.'0 2 Resolving this split is important because Congress
enacted SLUSA to create uniform national standards in order to
protect the effectiveness of the PSLRA, and different circuit court
approaches undermine Congress's intent."3
" Id. at 88.
96 Id.
"' Id. at 86-87.
98 Id.
9Id.
100 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2012).
101 See Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 554-55 (6th Cir.
2011); Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., 442 F. App'x 247, 248 (9th Cir. 2011);
Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009); LaSala v. Bordier
et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008); Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398
F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005).
102 Brown v. Calamos, 132 S. Ct. 2774 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 664 F.3d
123 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Brown, 664 F.3d at 127.
103 See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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1. The Third Circuit "Essential" Versus "Extraneous" Approach
The Third Circuit first addressed the scope of SLUSA's
misrepresentation language in Rowinski v. Salomon Smith
Barney Inc. 10 4 In Rowinski, the plaintiff filed a class action in
Pennsylvania state court alleging that Salomon Smith Barney,
one of the largest investment banks and stock brokerage firms in
the world at the time, disseminated "biased investment research"
that breached the parties' services contract, unjustly enriched the
firm, and violated state consumer protection law.1" 5 Salomon
Smith Barney removed the action to federal court and the district
court later granted its motion to dismiss based on SLUSA
preemption. 0 6 The district court reasoned that the plaintiff was
unable to escape the obvious connection between the
misrepresentations alleged in the analyst reports and the
purchase and sale of securities.0 7 While the plaintiff carefully
avoided alleging that his stock purchase decisions were affected,
the district court found the plaintiff would not be concerned with
the accuracy of the reports unless he relied on them. 08
Therefore, the lower court held that the complaint, despite its
language referring to state law, alleged a "misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact" and was therefore preempted by
SLUSA. 109
The Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court.110 The court concluded that "[tihe misrepresentation issue
is straightforward.""' The plaintiff alleged that Salomon Smith
Barney provided biased investment research and analysis to its
customers, artificially inflated the ratings and analysis of its
investment banking clients, and was fined for providing
materially misleading reports."2 The plaintiff argued that the
factual allegations of misrepresentation in the complaint were
104 398 F.3d 294, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2005).
105 Id. at 296.
106 Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., No. 3:02CV2014, 2003 WL
22740976, at *1, *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2003), affd, 398 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2005).
107 Id. at *3.
108 Id.
109 Id. at *2-4. The claims were dismissed without prejudice because the court
found the plaintiff may have been able to assert claims under federal securities laws.
Id. at *4 & n.6.
11'o Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 305.
I"' Id. at 299.
112 Id. at 299-300.
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irrelevant to the SLUSA inquiry because misrepresentation was
not an essential legal element of the claim. 113 However, the court
disagreed and reasoned that, "preemption does not turn on
whether allegations are characterized as facts or as essential
legal elements of a claim, but rather on whether the SLUSA
prerequisites are 'alleged' in one form or another."114  An
approach where only essential legal elements of a state claim
triggered preemption would be inconsistent with the plain
meaning of the statute and would allow artful pleading to
undermine SLUSA's goal of uniformity.'15 The court concluded
that SLUSA preempted the action because the allegations of a
material misrepresentation served as the factual predicate of the
state-law claim." 6 Because SLUSA preempted "actions" and not
"claims," the statute suggests that if any of the claims alleged
were preempted, the entire action must be dismissed; here, the
court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action without
prejudice. 117
A few years later, the Third Circuit, in LaSala v. Bordier et
Cie, altered its approach.118 In LaSala, the defendants Bordier et
Cie and Dominick Company (collectively, the "Banks") were
alleged to have assisted AremisSoft, a software enterprise, in
executing a "pump-and-dump" scheme.119 The plaintiffs, who
were trustees, asserted four claims: two counts of aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty and two counts of violating
Swiss money-laundering laws.120 The Banks filed a motion to
113 Id. at 300.
114 Id.
11 Id. ("The Congress finds that.., it is appropriate to enact national standards
for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities[.]"
(alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (2012) (Congressional Findings
of 1998 Amendment))).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 305 & n. 12 (noting that the district court dismissed the plaintiffs
claims without prejudice).
118 519 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2008).
119 Id. at 126. Once the scheme was discovered, the purchasers of the stock filed
a federal class action securities suit requesting rescission of their stock-purchase
contracts. Id. AremisSoft petitioned for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy while this suit was
pending. Id. To settle the suit, the purchasers were assigned all causes of action
owned by AremisSoft. Id. The plan for reorganization provided for the creation of a
state-law trust (the "Trust") to take title to and prosecute the assigned claims. Id. at
127. Joseph LaSala and Fred Ziedman were trustees of the Trust. Id.




dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was preempted by SLUSA.'2 ' The
plaintiff sought to hold the defendant liable for aiding and
abetting the misrepresentations and omissions made by third
parties.122 The district court looked to the Eighth Circuit for
guidance, which had previously held that SLUSA preemption
applied to the aiding and abetting claims against a defendant
when a plaintiff implicitly alleged misrepresentations or
omissions in connection with the purchase of securities. 123 Based
on Dabit, the Eighth Circuit's guidance, and the plain meaning of
SLUSA, the district court granted the motion to dismiss,
determining that all of the claims involved substantive
allegations of misrepresentations and were therefore preempted
by SLUSA."'
The Third Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the
complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion. 125  The court's relevant analysis
concerned the violations of Swiss money-laundering laws. 26 The
Banks argued that the state-law claims were preempted under
SLUSA, and because the Swiss law claims re-alleged and
incorporated the allegations supporting the state-law claims,
they too must be preempted.'27
The Third Circuit stated that the Banks were
misinterpreting its analysis in Rowinski, 28 which held that a
claim is preempted by SLUSA "when an allegation of a
misrepresentation in connection with a securities trade is a
'factual predicate' of the claim, even if misrepresentation is not a
legal element of the claim." 29  In Rowinski, the court had
reasoned that when a plaintiffs necessary fact was a
121 Id.
122 LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 452 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (D.N.J. 2006), vacated, 519
F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2008).
123 Id. at 587.
124 See id. at 588; LaSala, 519 F.3d at 129. The court did not specify whether or
not the dismissal was with or without prejudice. See generally LaSala, 452 F. Supp.
2d 575.
12' LaSala, 519 F.3d at 143. The case on remand was settled. LaSala v. Bordier
et Cie, No. 3:05-cv-04520 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2008).
126 LaSala, 519 F.3d at 140-42.
127 Id. at 140-41. The state-law claims in this case were remanded, but the
analysis was based on the "in connection with" language, not the misrepresentation
language, of SLUSA. Id. at 141, 143.
128 Id. at 141.




misrepresentation, it could not avoid SLUSA by altering its legal
theory.130 In LaSala, the court refrained its Rowinski analysis,
reasoning that the "misrepresentation" part of SLUSA is met
when an allegation of misrepresentation in connection with a
securities trade operates as a factual predicate. 131  A factual
predicate must give rise to liability; it cannot be an "extraneous
detail."132 The distinction matters because complaints are often
filled with more information than necessary.1 33  The court
concluded that the inclusion of extraneous allegations does not
require that the complaint be dismissed under SLUSA. 134  In
LaSala, the allegations of misrepresentation in the Swiss law
claims appeared to be extraneous. 135  Whether a preempted
action should be dismissed without prejudice remained an open
question for the court. 136
2. The Ninth Circuit "Intermediate" Approach
The Ninth Circuit addressed the scope of SLUSA's
preemption language involving misrepresentations in Stoody-
Broser v. Bank of America, N.A.131 In Stoody-Broser, trust
beneficiary and plaintiff Ellen Stoody-Broser filed a class action
complaint against Bank of America ("BOA"), the trustee. 38 The
complaint alleged "omissions of material fact and deceptive
practices" in connection with BOA's investment in proprietary
mutual funds; for example, the beneficiaries of the trust had no
knowledge of BOA's investments until after they were made. 139
The district court dismissed the complaint under SLUSA.40 The
district court found that while the allegations in the complaint
130 Id.; see also Rowinski, 398 F.3d at 299-300.





136 Id. at 129 n.6.
13' 442 F. App'x 247, 248 (9th Cir. 2011).
138 Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 08-02705 JSW, 2009 WL 2707393,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009), affd in part, rev'd in part, 442 F. App'x 247 (9th Cir.
2011).
131 Stoody-Broser, 442 F. App'x at 248. The complaint alleged that the trust
beneficiaries had no advance knowledge of BOA's investments until after they were
made, that BOA failed to document its transactions and to make documentation
available, and that omissions allowed BOA to "reap millions as a part of an unlawful
'scheme.' "Id.
140 Stoody-Broser, 2009 WL 2707393, at *5.
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involved violations of fiduciary obligations, the essence of the
complaint was that the defendants misrepresented and omitted
material facts relating to the investment. 141 Therefore, because
the gravamen of the complaint set forth "a scheme premised on
the inherent misrepresentations and omissions made by the
trustee," SLUSA preempted it.142
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, but
remanded the case with instructions to grant Stoody-Broser leave
to amend her complaint. 4  The court recognized its prior holding
in Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology Inc. 144 that a
misrepresentation does not have to be a specific element of a
claim to fall within SLUSA's preclusion provision. 145 As a result,
it agreed with the district court that the complaint was precluded
under SLUSA in its current form.
However, the court noted that "[dlismissal without leave to
amend is improper unless it is clear ... that the complaint could
not be saved by any amendment."146 While acknowledging the
danger of artful pleading, the court believed the complaint could
allege a violation of BOA's fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries
without alleging a misrepresentation, omission, or fraudulent
practice. 147 Consequently, the court remanded the case to give
Stoody-Broser an opportunity to plead such a complaint.148
On remand, the district court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss. 49  The court found that the amended complaint
removed all fraud claims and therefore "cured" all preemption
issues. 5 ° The court emphasized that the plaintiff changed both
the language and the substance of the claims. 5 ' While "the
original complaint alleged that Plaintiff[s] . .. were misled about
the investment of their trust assets, the amended complaint
alleges merely that Defendants fail[ed] to act with due care
141 Id. at *3.
142 Id. at *4.
14 Stoody-Broser, 442 F. App'x at 248-49.
144 584 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2009).
145 Stoody-Broser, 442 F. App'x at 248 (citing Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1222 n.13).
146 Id. (quoting Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002)).
141 Id. at 249.
148 Id.
149 Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 08-02705 JSW, 2012 WL 1657187,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012).




under their fiduciary obligations to do so."'52 The court held that
the claims were no longer preempted under SLUSA because they
were no longer predicated upon a misrepresentation.
15 3
In August 2012, the district court granted the defendant's
motion to certify immediate appeal on the denial of the
defendant's motion to dismiss.5  The court noted the
"substantial" disagreement in several circuit courts, including
the Ninth Circuit, regarding whether a plaintiff can amend a set
of facts to state a non-preempted claim. 55 The Ninth Circuit did
not accept the interlocutory appeal.
1 6
3. The Sixth Circuit "Literalist" Approach'57
The Sixth Circuit first addressed the scope of SLUSA's
misrepresentation language in Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A.""5
Segal was a beneficiary of a trust previously administered by
Fifth Third Bank.1 9 He sued the bank on behalf of himself and
all of the beneficiaries of the trust.' 6  The complaint asserted
state-law claims that Fifth Third breached its fiduciary duty and
contractual duty to the class.' 61 One specific allegation was that
the bank promised trust beneficiaries individualized
management but breached the agreement by providing
"standardized and largely automated management."'62  Fifth
Third filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted
for failure to state a claim under SLUSA. 6 3 The district court
found that the plaintiffs' action was premised upon the allegation
that Fifth Third misrepresented or failed to disclose material
facts, or engaged in a manipulative or deceptive course of conduct
when Fifth Third invested the plaintiffs' fiduciary funds.' The
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 08-02705 JSW, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112352, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012).
155 Id. at *4.
156 Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., No. 12-80159 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2012).
157 While this is called the Sixth Circuit Approach, support for it can be found in
other circuits in earlier cases. See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
156 581 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2009).
159 Id. at 308.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. The management was often by low-level or inexperienced employees. Id.
163 Id.
164 Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., No. 1:07-cv-348, 2008 WL 819290, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2008), affd, 581 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2009).
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fact that the plaintiffs avoided using the words
"misrepresentation" or "omission" did not matter because the
court looked to the substance of the allegations. 165
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis with the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of the SLUSA language in Dabit.166
The Sixth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's view that a narrow
reading of SLUSA would be inconsistent with ordinary principles
of statutory construction and would undercut the effectiveness of
the PSLRA.167 The court found that Segal's complaint contained
misrepresentations, material omissions, and manipulation. 168
But Segal included a disclaimer in the amended complaint that
stated that "[n]one of the causes of action stated herein are based
upon any misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts
to plaintiffis] .,"169 The court stated it must look to the substance
of the complaint's allegations in applying SLUSA; a plaintiff
cannot avoid its application through artful pleading that removes
the covered words from the complaint while leaving the covered
concepts. 7 ° SLUSA does not ask whether the complaint makes
material or dependent allegations of misrepresentation, it asks
"whether the complaint includes these types of allegations, pure
and simple." 71
The plaintiff tried to point to the Third Circuit's reasoning in
LaSala, arguing that the inclusion of extraneous allegations does
not require that the complaint be dismissed under SLUSA. 17 2
However, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the language of the Third
Circuit as dicta, emphasizing that the language of SLUSA does
not state "material," "dependent," or "extraneous" allegations. 7 3
Moreover, the court stressed that a broad interpretation of
SLUSA leaves no room for this "extraneous" analysis, which
165 Id.
166 Segal, 581 F.3d at 309.
167 Id.
168 Id. The complaint alleged that Fifth Third did not inform trust beneficiaries
that their trust accounts would be invested in proprietary mutual funds and the
Bank knowingly overcharged its clients, among other things. See id. at 309-10.
169 Id. at 310 (quoting Amended Complaint 2, Segal, 581 F.3d 305).
170 Id. at 310-11.
171 Id. at 311.
172 Id. at 311-12.




would be difficult to implement. 7 4 In SLUSA, Congress left open
many ways for claimants like Segal to vindicate their rights."'
As a result, the court concluded that the district court was
correct in granting the motion to dismiss because Segal's claim
was barred by SLUSA. 17
6
The Sixth Circuit again applied the literalist approach in
Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Management, Inc.'77 In Atkinson, the
plaintiffs held shares in three mutual funds that sustained losses
between 2007 and 2008.17' The plaintiffs filed a class action suit
in state court against the funds' advisors, officers, directors,
distributor, auditor, and affiliated trust company (collectively,
"Defendants"), attributing their losses to fraud. 7 9 The complaint
alleged thirteen state-law claims for breach of contract, violations
of the Maryland Securities Act, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, and negligent misrepresentation.18 0  The essence of
the plaintiffs' argument was that the Defendants took unjustified
risks in allocating the funds' assets and concealed the risks from
shareholders.1 8 1 Defendants removed the state action to federal
court under SLUSA. l8 2  Plaintiffs moved for remand, but the
district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for remand and
dismissed the action under SLUSA with prejudice.8 3 The district
court found that the plaintiffs' claims alleged facts dependent on
findings of deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, or omissions of a
material fact.18 4
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to
dismiss the complaint. 8 5  The court found that the complaint
alleged the Defendants failed to "provide truthful and complete
174 Id. The court also states that it presumes this is the reason why Rowinski
rejected this suggestion. Id.
175 Id. For example, Segal could have filed the same complaint on behalf of
himself and up to forty-eight other individuals and avoided SLUSA preclusion. Id.
Segal could have also filed a class action in accordance with PSLRA. Id.
176 Id.
177 658 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2011).
178 Id. at 551-52.





184 Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 898, 907 (W.D. Tenn.
2009), affd, 658 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2011).
185 Atkinson, 658 F.3d at 557.
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information" regarding the funds' portfolios." 6 The plaintiffs
contended that SLUSA only bars claims that require fraud as a
necessary element. 8 7 However, the court found this contention
to be inconsistent with the law of the Sixth Circuit, which
reviews the substance of a complaint's allegations, not allowing
claimants to avoid the application of SLUSA through "artful
pleading."8 8  The court concluded, "[a]pplying Segal, SLUSA
precludes [p]laintiffs' claims because they include allegations of
misrepresentations and omissions, 'pure and simple.' "1189 The
court reiterated that SLUSA cannot be tricked, and that the
plaintiffs could have avoided SLUSA preclusion by filing a class
action with less than fifty members.' 90
This approach has also been applied in the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits. In Dudek v. Prudential Securities, Inc.,' investors
brought a state court class action against their insurer "alleging
improper marketing of tax-deferred annuities to accounts that
already enjoyed tax-deferred status."1 2 Plaintiffs alleged the
annuities were improper investments because the tax-deferred
accounts did not need the tax benefits, so the extra costs and fees
were a waste of the investors' money. 9 3 The defendants removed
the case, and the district court dismissed the action with
prejudice.'94 The court found that the securities were covered by
SLUSA because the plaintiffs' claims were in substance based
upon "material misrepresentations and non-disclosures in the
purchase or sale of a covered security." 195
Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit in Dudek
found that the gravamen of the complaint involved an "untrue
statement or substantive omission of a material fact." 96
Moreover, the original complaint filed included allegations of
fraud and deceit. 9 The Eighth Circuit found that although the
186 Id. at 554.
187 Id. at 555.
188 Id.
189 Id. (quoting Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir.
2009)).
190 Id. at 556.
191 295 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 2002).
192 Id. at 877.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 877-78.
195 Id. at 878.




plaintiffs deleted the allegations of fraud and deceit, "both
complaints allege[d] that defendants misstated or omitted
material facts in connection with the purchase and sale of the
tax-deferred annuities."19 Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held the
complaint was preempted by SLUSA and affirmed the district
court decision.' 99
In Miller v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co.,20 Miller filed a
class action against Nationwide alleging breach of contract under
Louisiana law, arguing that "in its initial offerings Nationwide
had represented there would be no fees charged."2"' The district
court dismissed the contract claim under SLUSA.2 °2 Miller's
complaint alleged untrue statements and omissions, and
described actions by Nationwide as materially false and
misleading.0 3 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that preemption hinges
on the content of the allegations, not on the label given to the
cause of action, in this case a breach of contract claim.0 4
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded it was plain that
Miller alleged untrue statements and omissions of material fact,
so it dismissed the action, affirming the district court's
decision. °5
Therefore, while this approach has been labeled the Sixth
Circuit "literalist" approach, the Sixth Circuit is not the only
circuit that has utilized this approach.
III. THE CORRECT STANDARD: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT "LITERALIST"
APPROACH
In practice, the Third and Ninth Circuit approaches have led
to inconsistent and difficult-to-apply standards that clash with
Congress's intent and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
SLUSA. Conversely, the Sixth Circuit approach is consistent
with the language and congressional intent behind SLUSA. It is
also consistent with both the Supreme Court's interpretation of
preemption statutes generally, as well as the Court's
interpretation of SLUSA in Dabit. Finally, the literalist
198 Id. at 879-80.
199 Id. at 880.
200 391 F.3d 698 (5th Cir. 2004).
201 Id. at 699.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 699, 702.
204 Id. at 702.
205 Id.
2014]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
approach will lead to consistency among the circuits, which was
Congress's ultimate goal in enacting SLUSA, making it the
correct approach.
A. Criticism of the Third Circuit Approach
The Third Circuit's LaSala approach has proven to be
problematic and at odds with the court's earlier approach in
Rowinski, the language and intent behind SLUSA, and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of SLUSA. Further, this
approach has yielded inconsistent results in the lower courts and
has at times proven irrelevant to SLUSA preemption analysis.
In Rowinski, the Third Circuit noted that an approach "under
which only essential legal elements of a state law claim trigger
preemption, is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
statute."2 °6 The court in Rowinski concluded that it must look at
whether a misrepresentation or omission was alleged, not
whether it was a fact or essential legal element of the claim.20 7
The Third Circuit moved away from its Rowinski analysis in
LaSala, drawing a distinction between essential and extraneous
elements of a claim.20 ' The court in LaSala concluded that the
misrepresentation or omission must be a factual predicate of the
claim which gives rise to liability in order for the action to be
preempted by SLUSA. °9
SLUSA preempts any covered class action by "any private
party alleging-a misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact."210  According to the Supreme Court, the analysis of the
206 Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005).
207 Id. Despite the Third Circuit's subsequent LaSala opinion, a district court in
the Third Circuit recently applied the Rowinski analysis with only a brief mention of
LaSala or the distinction between essential and extraneous claims. See generally
Wilson v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, No. 11-511-SLR-SRF, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
151851 (D. Del. Oct. 22, 2012). This illustrates the uncertainty that exists within the
lower courts of the Third Circuit regarding which approach should be applied. While
the Rowinski approach is similar to the literalist approach, it is distinguishable
because the court requires dismissal without prejudice. See Rowinski, 398 F.3d at
305 & n.12. But cf Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 553 n.1,
556-57 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court's dismissal of claims with prejudice);
Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2009) (same). This
dismissal without prejudice presents the same issues that the Ninth Circuit
approach presents. See infra Part III.B.
208 LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008).
209 Id.
210 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2012).
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statute must begin with the text and its plain meaning.211 In
LaSala, the court noted that a misrepresentation must be a
factual predicate; it must be a fact that gives rise to liability, not
an extraneous detail.212 But looking at the text of the statute, the
Third Circuit's analysis in LaSala was inconsistent with the
plain meaning of SLUSA. SLUSA does not draw a distinction
between types of allegations. The text states that a class action
must be preempted if it involves "any private party alleging-a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact."2 13 Therefore,
reading in a requirement that the allegation must be essential to
the claim is inconsistent with the statute.
While it could be argued that the text of SLUSA is
inherently ambiguous, the next step in the proper analysis of
preemption statutes is to examine congressional intent.214
Congress intended to promote uniform national standards for
securities class action litigation involving national capital
markets.215  These uniform rules were necessary to protect
issuers from exposure to the jurisdictions of fifty different
states.216  SLUSA was prompted by the perceived flood of
litigants from federal to state courts to avoid the heightened
requirements of the PSLRA.1 7 Congress wanted to curb the
prevalence of strike suits through SLUSA.218 Under a system
that draws distinctions between essential and extraneous
elements of a claim, it would be nearly impossible to achieve the
uniformity that Congress envisioned in enacting SLUSA. This
approach gives courts enormous discretion, therefore making it
difficult for courts to produce consistent results, which operates
against Congress's intent to establish uniform national
standards.
211 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
212 LaSala, 519 F.3d at 141.
213 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A).
214 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 529 & n.27 (1992).
215 H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
216 Id. at 14-16.
217 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, § 2(2), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) note (Congressional
Findings of 1998 Amendment)).
218 O'Hare, supra note 31, at 334-35.
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Although the approach of distinguishing between an
essential claim necessary for liability and an extraneous one
seems like a defensible bright-line rule, it has not been applied
consistently in practice. This inconsistency is illustrated by In re
Charles Schwab Corporation Securities Litigation and Simon v.
Stang, two district court cases in the Northern District of
California that applied LaSala. 19 In Schwab, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants Charles Schwab Corporation and
several affiliated entities and individuals violated federal
securities laws and state laws by misrepresenting the risk profile
and assets of Schwab's YieldPlus Fund and by improperly
changing the fund's investment policies.22 ° When the court
reached its SLUSA analysis, it used the LaSala approach and
focused on the gravamen of the complaint. 221  Because the
plaintiffs agreed that Schwab properly disclosed the change in its
policy, none of the claims were predicated on a misrepresentation
and therefore they were not preempted by SLUSA.222 The
allegations that Schwab misrepresented the nature of the fund as
an "ultra-short bond fund" and misrepresented the fund's
portfolio duration were extraneous to the complaint despite their
incorporation by reference into the state-law claims.223
In Simon, the court attempted to distinguish Schwab. In
Simon, the plaintiffs alleged that they were wrongfully denied a
cumulative vote on a merger.224 The court noted that the
defendants' misrepresentations in Schwab were one means of
effectuating the scheme, whereas the change in policy was the
other.228  Here, the court concluded the cases were similar
because the defendants used multiple means to effectuate the
wrongful merger, including misstatements and denying a vote to
the common shareholders. 226 However, the claim incorporated by
reference several allegations of misrepresentations in connection
with voting rights.227 Therefore, the claim was precluded under
219 Simon v. Stang, No. C 10-00262 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 1460430 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
12, 2010); In re Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
220 In re Charles Schwab, 257 F.R.D. at 542.
221 Id. at 551.
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Simon, 2010 WL 1460430, at *5.





SLUSA because the complaint expressly alleged
misrepresentations and omissions in connection with the
violation.228
These decisions directly conflict with one another. In
Schwab, because the misrepresentations were incorporated by
reference in the claim, the court found they were extraneous and
therefore the claim was not precluded.229 In Simon, the court
concluded that because the allegations of misrepresentations
were incorporated by reference in the complaint the claim was
preempted, even though the plaintiffs had a valid claim without
the alleged misrepresentation.23 °  This inconsistency and
confusion is one reason why the LaSala approach is problematic.
Brown v. Calamos 231 illustrates another difficulty in applying
the LaSala standard. In Brown, shareholders in an investment
company filed a putative class action in state court alleging that
company officials breached their fiduciary duties and were
unjustly enriched by causing the company to redeem certain
preferred shares in a manner that unfairly benefitted preferred
shareholders.232 Judge Posner found that the allegation of fraud
would be difficult and maybe impossible to disentangle from the
charge of a breach of the duty of loyalty that the defendants owed
their investors.23 Because the fraud was pervasive, there was no
utility in distinguishing essential from extraneous elements of
the claim.2" 4 Brown highlights that the LaSala approach may
sometimes be irrelevant to a court's preemption analysis. '
Further, the Third Circuit's approach is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's interpretation of SLUSA in Dabit. There,
the Supreme Court underwent the above analysis and concluded
that SLUSA requires a broad interpretation in accordance with
228 Id.
229 In re Charles Schwab Corp. Sec. Litig., 257 F.R.D. 534, 551 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
220 Simon, 2010 WL 1460430, at *7.
231 664 F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 2011).
232 Brown v. Calamos, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129 (N.D. Ill. 2011), affd, 664
F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 2011).
233 Calamos, 664 F.3d at 129.
234 See id. at 128-29.
235 See id.; see also Jorling v. Anthem, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 821, 835 (S.D. Ind.
2011) ("As was the case in Brown, it would be impossible to 'disentangle' the
securities fraud issue from the state law claims involving fiduciary failure and
breach of contract.").
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statutory principles and congressional intent.236 It noted that a
narrow interpretation would both undercut the effectiveness of
the PSLRA as well as contradict SLUSA's stated purpose to
achieve uniformity.2 37  In LaSala, the court narrowed its
interpretation of SLUSA preemption by requiring that the
misrepresentation be a factual predicate that gives rise to
liability.238 The Third Circuit in LaSala distinguished essential
from extraneous elements of a claim, 239 a specific inquiry that is
at odds with the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of
SLUSA. Not only did the Third Circuit interpret SLUSA
narrowly, it also read language and meaning into the statute.
Moreover, this approach makes it impossible to achieve uniform
national standards, which was the intent of Congress in enacting
SLUSA.
Therefore, the Third Circuit's attempt in LaSala to narrow
the interpretation of the SLUSA preemption language is
inconsistent with both the language and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of SLUSA. The approach is also problematic
because it is difficult for courts to apply consistently, and
sometimes may even be irrelevant to a court's analysis.
B. Criticism of the Ninth Circuit Approach
A number of issues flow from the Ninth Circuit's
intermediate approach. This approach enables plaintiffs to avoid
SLUSA by changing the language of their complaint, ignoring the
possibility that the fraud could later be reintroduced into the
"cured" action. It also allows for an inefficient use of judicial
resources, and is inconsistent with the plain meaning and
congressional intent behind SLUSA.
Looking at the substance of the approach, after recognizing
the complaint in Stoody-Broser was preempted under SLUSA,
the Ninth Circuit tried to remedy the preemption issue by
allowing the plaintiff to amend the preempted complaint.2 40 The
gravamen of Stoody-Broser's original complaint involved a
236 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85-86
(2006).
237 Id. at 86.
238 LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008).
239 Id.




misrepresentation claim, yet the district court on remand found
SLUSA preemption no longer applied. 241 The court is supposed to
look beyond the allegations to the substance of a complaint to
avoid artful pleading.242 Instead, the Ninth Circuit's approach
enabled a plaintiff like Stoody-Broser to change the language of
her claim in order to avoid SLUSA preemption.243
Additionally, as Judge Posner determined in Brown v.
Calamos, the fraud element might enter into the litigation long
after the amended complaint is filed.244 The plaintiff, or its
lawyer, saw the allegation as adding substance to the original
complaint; otherwise they would not have included it.245
Therefore, while the new pleadings may no longer contain
allegations of fraud, there will be a temptation to reintroduce the
fraud allegations once the case is remanded to state court.246 To
allow removal of a complex commercial case after the pleadings
stage would unreasonably increase the length and cost of
litigation.247 Following the Ninth Circuit approach would lead to
inefficiency because once the gravamen of the complaint involves
misrepresentation, it must be preempted under SLUSA.248
The judicial inefficiency that follows from this approach is
illustrated by the subsequent history of Stoody-Broser. This
matter has now been heard by the district court, appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, remanded back to the district court, appealed back
to the Ninth Circuit where the appeal was not accepted, and is
now back in the district court.2 49 This demonstrates the large
waste of judicial resources that can result from this approach.
While giving a plaintiff a chance to amend its complaint seems
fair, the reality is that it is difficult for courts to determine
whether or not an amended complaint has been "cured."
241 Stoody-Broser v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 08-02705 JSW, 2012 WL 1657187,
at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012).
242 See Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 310-11 (6th Cir. 2009);
Rowinski v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 398 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2005); Miller v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 698, 702 (5th Cir. 2004).
243 Stoody-Broser, 2012 WL 1657187, at *4.
244 Brown v. Calamos, 664 F.3d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 2011).
245 Id. at 128.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 127.
24 See supra Part II.A.2.
249 See supra Part II.A.2.
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Additionally, dismissals of claims with prejudice serves as a
deterrent to strike suits. Congress was motivated to enact
SLUSA in part because of the perception that plaintiffs were
avoiding the heightened requirements of the PSLRA by bringing
their claims in state court.25 ° SLUSA only applies in very specific
and limited situations, and the plaintiff or plaintiffs attorney
needs to take responsibility for the allegations it includes in the
complaint. 251  For example, a plaintiff could entirely avoid
SLUSA by filing a complaint on behalf of forty-nine
individuals.252 By dismissing claims with prejudice, it deters
plaintiffs lawyers from bringing strike suits in state court and
forces plaintiffs and their attorneys to be more careful about
what they include in their complaint.
Further, like the Third Circuit's approach in LaSala, the
Ninth Circuit's approach is inconsistent with the plain meaning
of the statute and congressional intent. The language of the
statute does not indicate that plaintiffs are to be given a second
shot at pleading their complaints. It plainly states that if a
complaint involves an allegation of fraud, the suit is
preempted.253 Moreover, allowing plaintiffs to take a second bite
of the apple runs against congressional intent in enacting
SLUSA. Congress wanted to prevent issuers from exposure to
the jurisdictions of all fifty states and to stop the flood of
litigation from state to federal court.254 The Ninth Circuit's
approach would lead to issuers being exposed to many different
state jurisdictions because it allows plaintiffs to simply take the
language of fraud out of their complaints and proceed at the state
level. While the suit could theoretically be removed a second
time, it would be a gross waste of limited judicial resources. This
250 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, § 2(2), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (2012)
(Congressional Findings of 1998 Amendment)).
251 See Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 312 (6th Cir. 2009).
However, this contention should not be carried out to the extent where a plaintiff is
punished for hiring a bad lawyer. Taken to its logical extreme, it could admittedly
lead to unfair results for claimants.
252 Atkinson v. Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., 658 F.3d 549, 556 (6th Cir. 2011).
253 See LaSala v. Bordier et Cie, 519 F.3d 121, 141 (3d Cir. 2008).
254 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act § 2(2), 112 Stat. at 3227;
H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
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approach is at odds with the statutory language and purpose of
SLUSA. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
SLUSA preemption language cannot be correct.
C. The "Literalist" Approach Is the Correct Standard
1. The Literalist Approach Is Consistent with the Language of
SLUSA and Congressional Intent
Unlike the Third and Ninth Circuit approaches, the literalist
approach is consistent with the language of SLUSA as well as
Congress's intent in enacting the statute. It is also consistent
with the Supreme Court's ruling in Dabit, and the approaches of
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits in earlier cases.255
The language of SLUSA is broad. It does not distinguish
essential from extraneous claims, and it does not give plaintiffs
the ability to avoid preemption by amending their complaints.256
According to the language, when there is a misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact alleged in a complaint, it is
preempted.257  The Sixth Circuit's approach does not read
anything into the language; it takes it at face value. While some
may argue the language is vague, the literalist approach is
further supported by congressional intent.
Congress intended that SLUSA be interpreted broadly to
reach all procedural devices that may be used to try to
circumvent the Reform Act.25 8 Congress wanted to eliminate
strike suits, which had become a problem since the passage of the
PSLRA.2 59 The Sixth Circuit approach is consistent with those
intentions. When a plaintiff inserts a fraud allegation in a
complaint, or the complaint clearly implicates issues of fraud, the
action is dismissed, "pure and simple."260 This approach does not
read additional requirements into the statutory text, and
therefore is consistent with both the language and purpose of
SLUSA.
255 See Segal, 581 F.3d at 312.
256 See supra Part 1ILA-B.
257 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(1)(A) (2012).
258 See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 10 (1998).
259 O'Hare, supra note 31, at 334-35.
260 Segal, 581 F.3d at 311.
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2. The Literalist Approach Is Consistent with the Supreme
Court's Interpretation of Preemption Statutes and of SLUSA
in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit
The literalist approach properly applies Supreme Court
precedent. It is consistent with the statutory text, which is
where the Supreme Court begins its analysis.261 This approach is
also supported by the Court's two presumptions about
preemption.262 In drafting SLUSA, Congress did not "cavalierly"
preempt state law; the statute only applies to "covered
securit[ies]" in specially defined class action suits. 263  Congress
also legislated a number of exceptions to SLUSA, further
illustrating that it had a clear and manifest purpose consistent
with the Supreme Court's first presumption that Congress does
not act "cavalierly."264
The Sixth Circuit approach promotes and enables uniformity
within the circuits, in harmony with congressional purpose in
enacting SLUSA.2 61 The literalist approach is the least
discretionary approach; a court makes its decision based on the
existence of a fraud allegation. 266  This approach does not
distinguish between essential and extraneous allegations or
allow for plaintiffs to amend their original preempted
complaints.267 It looks at the text and substance of the complaint,
261 See Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); see supra Part III.C. 1.
262 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Gade, 505 U.S. at
111).
26S See supra Part I.B.2 (explaining that the Supreme Court concluded that
Congress did not act cavalierly in enacting SLUSA); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 83 (2006) (discussing the definition of "covered
securit[ies]").
264 See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
265 See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, § 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (2012)
(Congressional Findings of 1998 Amendment)).
266 See generally Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 2009).
267 See supra Part III.A.
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and if there is fraud it preempts the suit, satisfying the Supreme
Court's second presumption that the touchstone of the analysis of
preemption statutes is Congress's intent.
This approach is also in line with the Supreme Court's
reading of SLUSA in Dabit. SLUSA was enacted due to the
unintended consequences that flowed from the requirements of
the PSLRA.269 The Court concluded that ordinary principles of
statutory construction and the purposes for enacting SLUSA
supported a broad reading of the statute.27 0 The Sixth Circuit's
approach follows the interpretation of the Supreme Court. It
keeps in mind the reasons for enacting SLUSA, what Congress
was trying to prevent, and reads the text of the statute in a way
which is not only consistent with the Supreme Court's view but
also would enable all courts to reach the same outcome.
3. The Literalist Approach Will Lead to Consistency Among the
Circuits
In SLUSA, Congress stated, "[I]n order to prevent certain
State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from
being used to frustrate the objectives of the [PSLRA], it is
appropriate to enact national standards for securities class
action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities ....
Congress saw the shift of litigation from federal to state court,
and saw it as curbing the effectiveness of the 1995 Reform Act.
2 7 2
Due to the strong federal interest in the regulation of securities
to protect investors and promote strong markets, Congress
enacted SLUSA.273
The policies underlying this statute are consistency and
uniformity. Congress wanted litigants to face the same
standards throughout the country; it did not want issuers to be
exposed to the jurisdictions of all fifty states.274  The literalist
26 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (alteration in
original) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)); see also
Part III.C.1.
269 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 86
(2006).
270 Id. at 85-87.
271 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
§ 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227, 3227 (emphasis added) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note (2012)
(Congressional Findings of 1998 Amendment)).
272 See id. § 2(2)-(3).
271 See id. § 2(4).
274 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14-16 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
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approach is in line with the policies underlying SLUSA. The
Sixth Circuit's interpretation of SLUSA enables consistency
throughout the nation by looking to see whether there is an
allegation of fraud in the language and substance of the
complaint, "pure and simple."27  This approach is
straightforward; it does not leave room for guesswork. Congress
laid out specific standards for SLUSA preemption, and that
specificity coupled with its intention to create uniform national
standards supports the Sixth Circuit's clear and easily applicable
approach. While it would be impossible to find an approach that
completely eliminates a court's discretion, the Sixth Circuit
minimizes judicial discretion by having clear guidelines for when
a class action brought under state law is preempted.
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit's literalist approach, which has also been
applied in other jurisdictions,276 furthers Congress's purpose in
enacting SLUSA. SLUSA was meant to create uniform national
standards for securities class action lawsuits. Since its
enactment, courts have interpreted the misrepresentation
language of SLUSA's preemption statute differently. The
Supreme Court has held that SLUSA should be interpreted
broadly so that it does not undercut the 1995 Reform Act's
effectiveness. The Sixth Circuit approach does this by employing
a standard that enables uniformity throughout the nation. Its
standard is broad and requires courts to preempt lawsuits that
allege fraud in the language or substance of the complaint.
Because this approach involves minimal judicial discretion, it
would enable courts to come out with the same result in most
cases, thereby supporting Congress's intent in enacting SLUSA.
In order to achieve uniformity, the SLUSA misrepresentation
language must be interpreted broadly, consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of SLUSA and Congress's goal of
uniform national standards for securities class action lawsuits.
In turn, this will have a positive effect on both individuals and
the securities markets by protecting investors and promoting
strong and efficient markets.
275 Segal v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 581 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2009).
276 See supra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
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